Brigham Young University Prelaw Review
Volume 22

Article 11

4-1-2008

ICANN Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy— A Model of
International Intellectual Property Law Enforcement
Clayton Nylander

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byuplr

BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Nylander, Clayton (2008) "ICANN Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy— A Model of International Intellectual
Property Law Enforcement," Brigham Young University Prelaw Review: Vol. 22 , Article 11.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byuplr/vol22/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University Prelaw Review by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive.
For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

ICANN Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy—A
Model of International Intellectual Property
Law Enforcement
by Clayton Nylander1

D

I. Introduction

uring the nineteenth century, the social and economic development of major countries within Europe and North
America compelled these nations to utilize laws and courts
to protect the intangible rights of their creative geniuses. Property
rights for the works of inventors, authors, composers, and publishers
became increasingly important to provide a marketable incentive for
these people to continue their creative works. The value of exclusive
ownership was realized as intellectual property rights began to blossom. Although some countries still do not recognize the value of
intellectual property protection, others have flourished because of
the economic incentives provided by exclusive property rights.
Intellectual property (IP) describes the legal property rights of
intangible information and ideas in their expressed form.2 The purpose of intellectual property is to provide exclusive ownership in the
commercialization of a product or idea. The great economic incentive for the owner to obtain and create intellectual property is the
right to exclude the use or reproduction of a product or service.
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The potential profitability in obtaining intellectual property
rights has led to a growing demand for these rights in an international context. Useful intellectual property is often imported into a
country for that country’s benefit. Additionally, the available profitability of marketing intellectual property internationally produces
an incentive for many countries to generate competitive ideas and
products. The lure of international markets has been the catalyst for
the creation of large amounts of intellectual property in recent years.
Thus, the global diffusion of international intellectual property has
increased dramatically.
The rise of international intellectual property mandates effective methods of regulation and enforcement. As this enforcement
is paramount in maintaining the economic incentive of intellectual
property, it has emerged as a controversial issue with global proportions. The Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) was created
to resolve the international conflict involving the distribution and
possession of Internet domain names. This paper first seeks to discuss the current problems originating from international intellectual
property regulation, and then discuss how many of these same problems arise in the regulation of Internet domain names. The discussion will then describe how these problems with Internet domain
names prompted the creation of the UDRP as well as describe some
of the leading opposition for the UDRP. Finally, this paper will discuss the components of the policy that make it effective, and end
with suggestions and recommendations on how to overcome some of
the problems inherent in its application and structure. The purpose of
this paper is to contend that the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy,
as a means of regulating the use of Internet domain names, displays
many components of effective application, structure, and regulation
to effectively resolve Internet domain names and, with the proper
modification, can serve as a model regulatory policy to overcome
many of the pitfalls that currently plague international IP law.
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II. Current Problems With
International Intellectual Property Law
The international community faces several problems that prevent
effective enforcement of international intellectual property laws. In
the current international context, IP rights established in one country “vanish abruptly and completely at the national border.”3 The
vast difference of international IP laws across the globe is a primary
contributor to the lack of harmonized international IP enforcement.
Most countries make no concessions to recognize the IP laws of any
country but their own. As clarified by G. Gregory Letterman, the IP
rights provided to an IP possessor seeking legal protection internationally are predicated upon the allowances specifically provided by
each jurisdiction where IP protection is sought.4
IP laws often vary by country because the existence and enforcement of such laws present varying degrees of benefits to different countries. This disparity becomes vividly apparent in the context
of developing countries and their deliberate avoidance of IP regulation. The struggle between those who seek enforcement of IP laws
and those who do not has developed a chasm between the developed
and underdeveloped countries of the world. Countries such as China,
India, and South Korea have deliberately avoided IP law regulation
because of the economic benefits that they derive from this illicit
activity.5 The developed countries are crying for stiffer regulation
as the under-developed countries continue to enjoy the benefits of
infringement. A worldwide conflict of interests has developed.6 The
current structure and regulation of IP laws, however, does little to
resolve this issue.
3

G. Gregory Letterman, Basics of International Intellectual Property Law
12 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2001) (2001).
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Experts cite multiple reasons to explain why developing countries choose not to enforce intellectual property rights. A lack of
resources is one particular obstacle for IP enforcement. Resources
such as time and money are required for the litigation of IP infringement, yet such resources are often lacking in developing countries.
A proposed violation of an IP right in one country could cause years
of investigation as well as astronomical amounts of litigation fees.
Many governments deem such use of time and money as a poor allocation of resources. As a result, in some countries, IP infringement
flourishes. India, for example, has left major IP infringement issues,
such as software piracy, unrestrained because effective enforcement
exists as “a mandate disproportionate to its resources.”7
Additionally, the lack of cost-benefit trade-offs further reduces
incentive for developing countries to enforce intellectual property
laws. Because intellectual property in a developed country often
comes from a more developed nation, the regulation for that IP is
often instigated by the developed country. Thus, the majority of IP
enforcement taking place in a country such as India exists to directly benefit the foreign owners of the intellectual property. The
protection of domestic industries is yet another reason why developing countries fail to enforce IP laws. Jobs created by engaging in
IP infringing activities typically employ more and create a larger
economic return for the country than the more specialized jobs associated with IP enforcement. Countries would not want to divert
precious resources away from an illicit activity, such as piracy, to the
less profitable activity of intellectual property enforcement. Some
developing countries even cite the “Robin Hood” mentality, that of
stealing from the rich to help the poor, in order to rationalize their
own lack of intellectual property enforcement.8 In short, different
countries continue to produce differing IP laws that lack the congruence necessary for widespread use, and the resulting problems have
only escalated in recent years.
The problems described above affect all areas of intellectual
property, including Internet domain names. Although the enforce7

Id. at 315.

8

Id. at 301.
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ment of Internet domain names described below is not divided precisely between developed and under-developed countries, the issue
of Internet domain name enforcement contains many of the same
regulatory difficulties described above. Many domain name users
seek to free-ride and enjoy the benefits of established trademarks.
No central regulatory agency has existed in the past to ensure the
proper regulation of Internet domain names. The remainder of this
paper will examine the problems concerning Internet domain names
and how the UDRP, within the scope of proper application, has effectively solved many of the regulatory issues plaguing international
intellectual property law.

III. Current Problems With Internet Domain Names
A. Cybersquatting
The growing issue of Internet domain name disputes manifests
many of the problems faced by international intellectual property.
Domain names are a type of trademark that were originally created
to allow Internet users to locate computers and people in a convenient manner. In recent years, however, the use of domain names has
increased in significance as they are used to identify commercial
businesses, many of which already possess identifying trademarks
protected by existing intellectual property rights. The presence of
domain name disputes often arises from cases of cybersquatting, the
strategy of an individual or company registering certain trademarks
as private domain names. As described by the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), cybersquatters exploit the easiness
of domain name registration by reserving domain names of unrelated
businesses or celebrities for personal gain. As owners of such domain
name registration, cybersquatters often attempt to sell their domain
name rights to their corresponding businesses at prices high above
typical registration. As an alternative, cybersquatters may maintain
their domain name rights to use the company’s trademark to at-

100
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tract business of their own.9 Original trademark holders often
take legal action to have the disputed domain name transferred
from the respondent or registrant (the party seeking to control the
contended domain name) to the complainant (the original trademark holder).
B. Trademark Law and Internet Domain Names
Until the mid-nineties, trademark law did little to combat the
problems derived from cybersquatting. Trademark laws are typically created by national jurisdictions and are typically organized
around regional and geographical borders. The Internet, however,
is “defiantly ignorant” of these borders.10 According to the Lanham
Act, which contains the United States’ statutes on trademark law,
trademark infringement requires “commercial use in commerce” of
the trademark by the accused infringer.11 Courts have varied in their
interpretation of what constitutes “commercial use.” Courts often
rule that a cybersquatter using another entity’s trademark as their
own domain name is illegal due to trademark infringement or dilution. (Dilution refers to the reduction of the value of a trademark
when an outside party abuses the trademark.) The landmark case
of Panavision International v. Toeppen12 found that selling a registered domain name to the original trademark owner of the name for
a profit is considered commercial use under the Federal Trademark

9

World Intellectual Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/
center/faq/domains.html#5 (last visited Nov. 23, 2006).

10

A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy—
Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 Brooklyn Law Review, 608, 608 (2002)
(discussing the regulation of Internet trademark law).

11

Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common
Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1702 (1999) (discussing the meaning of “commercial use in commerce”).

12

Panavision International, LP, v. Toeppen 141 F.3d 1316, 1316–1327 (9th
Cir. 1998). See also Michael A. Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace:
Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and The Constitution, 50, Duke
L.J. 17, 60-61 (2000).
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Dilution Act.13 Courts found that Princeton Review’s registering the
domain name kaplan.com, its primary competitor, was primarily for
commercial profit, and thus illegal.14 Other cases’ decisions have not
been as unambiguous. Some courts have ruled that “reserving” a
domain name by merely registering it does not constitute trademark
infringement, given the registrant makes no use of the name.15 The
growth of cybersquatting on the Internet during the middle to late
nineties revealed that existing trademark laws could not be easily
applied to this new breed of trademark infringement cases.
C. The Need to Combat Cybersquatting
Domain name conflicts between the registrant and the original
trademark holder have been raging for over a decade. The first case
to highlight the issue occurred in 1994 when Joshua Quittner seized
the domain name mcdonalds.com and then publicized the issue in
an article in Wired Magazine.16 Quittner’s move quickly exposed
the potential rewards available to registrants who can procure an extremely valuable domain name at minimal cost and inconvenience.
Domain names are available on a first-come, first-serve basis.17 In
order to use a domain name, an organization may obtain the right to
a certain domain name for a certain period. An entity simply must
contact any one of a number of registrars, who then officially register
the domain name for the registrant. The entity may renew its use of
the domain name after the designated period of time comes to an
end.18 This convenient and inexpensive application process, coupled
13

Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).

14

Lemley, supra note 11.

15

See Juno Online Service v. Juno Lighting, Inc. 979 FSupp 684 (1997).
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See http://www.wirednews.com/wired/archive/2.10/mcdonalds.html.
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Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: An Analysis of ICANN’s Uniform Dispute
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with the lure of the resale of attractive domain names at six-figure
values, led to a surge in registered domain names during the middle
and late nineties.19
Abuses began to develop. Companies began to register the domain names of their competitors in order to re-direct Internet traffic
to their own business. So-called “oops” domain names propagated
where slight variations of popular company, service, and celebrity
names (up to twenty or thirty of them) were registered in order to
draw the attention of unsuspecting Internet users who misspelled
their targeted site.20 As the popularity and widespread use of the
Internet increased, so did the resulting incidences of cybersquatting.
WIPO claims that the stimulation of business, the difficulty in discovering the true user of a trademark, and the principle of freedom
of expression all contribute to the recent increase in improper domain name registration. Additionally, the growing value of Internet
business has increased the profitability of owning business trademarks online.21
A negative by-product of cybersquatting developed as original
trademark owners began to use “their legal and financial muscle to
evict legitimate domain name holders from valuable registrations”
that the registrant not only wanted but had a justifiable right in owning.22 This phenomenon, dubbed reverse domain name hijacking, illustrates how the complainants, the alleged trademark owner, often
receive undue power, while little protection is given to the domain
name registrar. Often the “legally untutored or resource poor” registrants are forced to surrender domain names to the frivolous claims
of the trademark holders.23 A computer consulting company, whose
owner’s surname was Prince, legally registered prince.com, but the
sports equipment manufacturer later sued Mr. Prince for rights to the
19

Mueller, supra note 17, at 3.

20

Id.

21

World Intellectual Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/
center/faq/domains.html#5 (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).

22

Mueller, supra note 17.

23

Froomkin, supra note 10, at 692–693.
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domain name. The registrant ended up spending over three hundred
thousand dollars in order to protect the domain name.24
The resulting situation involving disputes over Internet domain
names is complex, with no clear victim or culprit.25 Trademark disputes across the Internet are not similar to standard trademark infringement against which current intellectual property laws fight.
The development of Internet domain name disputes required a form
of regulation that existing trademark law did not satisfy. The need
for a new means of regulation was larger than ever before.

IV. The Creation of the Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy
WIPO is one of multiple specialized agencies created by the
UN with the intention of promoting “the protection of intellectual
property throughout the world through cooperation among States
and, where appropriate, in collaboration with any other international
organization.”26 In 1998, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued
the Statement of Policy on Management of Internet Names in which
it called upon WIPO to initiate a balanced and transparent process,
which includes the participation of trademark holders and members
of the Internet community who are not trademark holders, to
(1) develop recommendations for a uniform approach to resolving trademark/domain name disputes involving cyberpiracy (as opposed to conflicts between trademark holders
with legitimate competing rights), (2) recommend a process
for protecting famous trademarks in the generic top level
domains, and (3) evaluate the effects, based on studies
conducted by independent organizations . . . of adding
new gTLDs [generic top level domains] and related dis24

Mueller, supra note 17, at 4.

25

Id. at 14.

26

A. Michael Froomkin, Semi-Private International Rulemaking: Lessons
Learned from the WIPO Domain Name Process, see http://personal.law.
miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/TPRC99.pdf (last visited Dec 12, 2007).
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pute resolution procedures on trademark and intellectual
property holders.27
WIPO began investigating the growing issue of domain names and
trademark usage on the Internet.28 Following their investigation,
WIPO recommended instituting a policy that would affect all Internet domain name registrars, controlling dispute resolution of Internet domain space. WIPO gave the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN), created by the U.S. Government to
provide technical management of the Internet’s infrastructure, the
responsibility to create a policy that would satisfy the criteria and
recommendations set forth by WIPO. They sought to create a regulatory regime for domain name protection to optimize trademark
protection. Subsequent subcommittees were formed which thereafter submitted a proposed policy to the ICANN board as a consensus
recommendation. In October 1999, the ICANN board approved the
implementation of the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).29
ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy requires every registrant on the Internet to agree to arbitration provided by ICANN’s
arbitration providers that should there be any possible trademark dispute between an existing trademark holder and the registrant.30
The overall purpose of the UDRP is to resolve conflicts resulting
from the misuse of trademarks within Internet domain spaces. Under
the UDRP, a complainant may file a case that specifies the disputed
domain name, the holder of domain name rights, the registrar of the
domain name, and the grounds for the complaint. ICANN specified
the following three criteria that must be met in order to challenge a
domain name:

27

Id.

28

ICANN, http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm (last visited Nov.
20, 2006).

29

ICANN, http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm (last visited Nov.
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The domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a
trademark or service mark in which the complainant has
rights; and
The registrant has no rights or legitimate interests in respect
of the domain name; and
The domain name has been registered and is being used
in bad faith.31
All three of the above conditions must be met before the case is ruled
in favor of the complainant.32 After a decision is made, the domain
name is either transferred, canceled, or the complaint is denied.33
ICANN further defined the term “bad faith”, establishing the
criteria for the complainant to indicate bad faith as well as the
criteria needed for respondent to establish that no bad faith was
used in the registration of the name. Despite the stipulated criteria, enough latitude exists in the language of the UDRP to allow
drastically different interpretations of the cases, depending on
the dispute resolution provider.34
In cases involving the UDRP, ICANN utilizes four organizations to act as arbitrators to resolve disputes. These major dispute
resolution service providers are: the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), based in Switzerland; the National Arbitration
Forum (NAF), from the U.S.; eResolution, from Canada; and the
CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution (CPRADR), also based in
the U.S.35 These arbitration panels utilize diversified arbitrators
from across the globe. Diversified panels reduce the probability
of national bias, as well as to improve the international scope of
the UDRP’s enforcement.
31

Mueller, supra note 17, at 21.

32

Id.

33

World Intellectual Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/
center/faq/domains.html#2 (last visited Nov. 20, 2006).

34

Mueller, supra note 17, at 21.

35

Id. at 10.
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V. Opposition to the UDRP
Despite the apparent benefits of the UDRP, opponents to the
policy claim several reasons to explain its ineffectiveness. ICANN
currently allows the complainant to choose the dispute resolution
service provider. Evidence shows that the selection of a service provider by the complainant can often lead to “forum shopping” which
can bias the decision. Statistically, WIPO and NAF have a record of
ruling in favor of the trademark holders. Not surprisingly, WIPO and
NAF attract the largest number of cases (61 percent and 31 percent
respectively) by complainants. eResolution, which typically rules in
favor of the defendant, typically attracts only 7 percent of cases.36
The bias from selecting a favorable service provider is compounded,
opponents argue, by the policy’s current inability to challenge an
arbitrator if believed to be biased or to have a conflict of interest.
Currently, arbitrators are expected to reveal any possible conflicts
of interest. If the arbitrator is truly biased, however, efforts will be
made to skew the degree of conflict. Therefore, regulation must exist
to effectively determine the existence of an intolerable conflict of interests. For example, if the arbitrator is a member of a firm, and that
firm maintains a position on a disputed arbitration law, speculation
would surface if the arbitrator is allowed to decide a case involving
a similar law.37 Because the current policy lacks such stipulations,
UDRP opponents have demanded an effective means to eliminate
the possibility of biased arbitrators.
Another argument made by UDRP opponents involves the arbitrators’ negligence to legitimate ownership of domains. Kieren McCarthy explains that in order for a complainant to reclaim a domain
name from the registrant, the complainant must show the arbitrators
that the registrant “has no rights or legitimate interests” in the name.
UDRP opponents claim that large amounts of arbitrators have a history in trademark law.38 Arbitrators’ background in trademark law
36

Id. at 2.

37

Froomkin, supra note 10, at 638.

38

See Kieren McCarthy, The Registrar, (Oct. 4, 2001), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/10/04/what_the_hell_is_udrp/.
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often translates into a bias toward major trademark owners. This
bias, challengers claim, often causes even legitimate domain names
to be judged unfairly. Such arbitrator bias has been manifested in the
numerous sucks.com cases, having the form [company]sucks.com.
Many claim this to be a fair use of a domain name. However, WIPO
determined that such sites violated the UDRP because of their damaging effects to the company and its trademark.39

VI. Effectiveness of the UDRP
A. Application
Notwithstanding the minor flaws inherent in the application of
this policy, the UDRP has unfolded to be an effective example of international intellectual property regulation. One of the applications
of the UDRP that contributes to its success is its use of arbitration
panels. Typically used as the cost-effective alternative to litigation,
arbitration is particularly useful in settling disputes that involve the
private rights of two parties. According to WIPO, arbitration can be
useful in dealing with highly technical areas and an arbitrator with
a technical background is often used. Additionally, arbitration is often more time efficient than court litigation. IP cases brought before
the arbitration of WIPO are normally resolved within two months.40
The average time it takes to settle a case when brought before one of
the four dispute resolution providers is forty-three days.41 Traditional
litigation, however, would mandate years for the same resolution The
cost of arbitration is also consistently lower than the typical costs of
courtroom cases. The fees involved with using such an arbitration
panel equate to a fraction of those involved with litigation. WIPO describes that cases involving multiple patent names often only require

39

McCarthy, supra note 38.

40

World Intellectual Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/
center/faq/domains.html#2 (last visited Dec. 3, 2006).

41

Mueller, supra note 17, at 17.
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a few thousand dollars of fees.42 The U.S. Department of Commerce
commended the UDRP as being “an efficient, inexpensive procedure for the resolution of disputes.”43 Such time and cost efficiency
in filing domain name disputes has helped battle the high volume of
domain name dispute cases in recent years.
Yet another unique advantage presented by the UDRP is the focused nature of its application. Often the international application
of IP laws is unfeasible, because of the inability of a single policy to
apply appropriately to the multitude of situations in each tried case.
A regulatory body cannot create a policy that accommodates all
possible circumstances. The UDRP, however, narrows the scope of
its application in order to provide feasible application. As explained
by ICANN laws, the UDRP can only be applied to .com, .net, and
.org top-level domain names.44 Kieren McCarthy of The Register
explains that only the misuse of registered trademarks recognized by
WIPO can merit an investigation. The policy only applies to trademark holders contending with non-trademark holders. The UDRP
purposefully avoids cases involving the use of personal names, the
names of places, and the names of drugs and governmental organizations.45 Narrowing the scope of the UDRP’s application prevents
vain investigation of unregistered trademarks. The focused function
of the UDRP allows it to hurdle over the application problems that
burden most existing international IP law.
B. Structure
In addition to its application, certain structural components of
the UDRP add to its effectiveness. The diversified and objective arbitrators used by ICANN are a structural advantage of the UDRP.
Currently, an expert panelist or group of panelists is chosen to re42

World Intellectual Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/
center/faq/domains.html#2 (last visited Dec. 2, 2006).

43

Froomkin, supra note 10, at 609.

44

ICANN, http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24cot99.htm,
(last visited Dec. 3, 2006).

45

McCarthy, supra note 38.
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view the debated domain name. As outlined by WIPO policy, the
specific circumstances of each case, such as the nationality and languages of the parties dictate the selection of these panels. Although
opponents argue the inherent bias of many arbitrators, these panelists are chosen from a roster of qualified independent individuals.
Furthermore, arbitrator bias is avoided by having a large selection of
arbitrators from whom/which to choose. The panelists must also disclose to WIPO adequate information to show the absence of a conflict of interest in the case and all other facts that would affect their
appointment to the case.46 Through the selection and use of neutral
panelists, ICANN thus minimizes the problem of biased arbitrators.
Limiting this problem is yet another building block that has allowed
the UDRP to rise above the difficulty of international intellectual
property law.
Another structural advantage of the UDRP is the ease by which
arbitration can occur. The rules established by ICANN stipulate that
for cases involving cybersquatting, the consent of both parties is not
mandated for an investigation to take place. So long as the arguing
party provides the necessary evidence and documentation, arbitration can begin to investigate the possibility of domain name misuse.
On the other hand, if a domain name is transferred or canceled, the
owner of the domain name is given a period of time to demand further investigation of the case.47 In order to aid registrars who are
legally uninformed, the arbitrators are required to clearly stipulate in
a letter the domain holder’s rights and options for re-investigation.48
Thus, the delineated rights of the parties involved in the dispute
provide an uncomplicated arbitration method to allow justice to be
served. The simplicity of the arbitration process is yet another factor
that contributes to the efficient implementation of the UDRP.

46

World Intellectual Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/
center/faq/domains.html#2 (last visited Dec. 2, 2006).

47

ICANN, http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm
(last visited Nov. 20, 2006).

48

Telephone interview with Jim Belshe, Attorney, Workman Nydegger Law
Firm, in Salt Lake City, UT (Dec. 5, 2006).
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Additionally, although opponents argue that reverse domain
name hijacking and excessive complaints against existing domain
name holders are harmful, the structure of the UDRP mandates that
there is no default judgment during decision-making. Belshe explains
that in typical court litigation, default judgment refers to judgment
that benefits the plaintiff when the defendant has not acted according to court orders. This type of judgment does not exist with the
UDRP. In other words, inaction by the domain name holder does not
guarantee success for the complainant.49 For example, a complainant may file a case to retrieve a certain domain name. Under UDRP
rules, the complainant does not need the consent of the domain name
holder to file the case. Typical law states that inaction by the defendant, regardless of whether the defendant was informed, could result
in a ruling in favor of the plaintiff. The UDRP, however, in order
to prevent any unfair action taken against an unsuspecting domain
name holder, allows the arbitration panel to cause a complainant to
lose the case if the panel deems his/her evidence insufficient. This
lack of default judgment allows the UDRP to better protect legally
uninformed domain name owners. The unique structure and content
of the UDRP eliminate many of the obstacles that encumber internet
domain name rights.
C. Regulation
The regulation and enforcement of the UDRP is yet another ingenious component that has contributed to the success of this policy.
ICANN specifies that, according to the UDRP, all registrars of domain spaces must register under the contract mandated by ICANN.
A domain space cannot be granted unless the registrar agrees to the
contractual agreement implemented by ICANN and WIPO.50 This
contractual agreement thus regulates the distribution of Internet domain names. Any registrar of a .com, .net, and .org domain name
is required to adopt the UDRP as the procedure of their domain
49

Belshe, supra note 48.

50

ICANN, http://www.icann.org/dndr/udrp/policy.htm (last visited Nov. 23,
2006).
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name dispute resolution procedure if they are to be recognized by
ICANN.51 All involved parties, regardless of location, are thus required to abide by the laws established by ICANN and WIPO. Any
breeching of the contract will cause the involved parties to be subject
to the consequences set forth in the contract.
Most IP laws fall short of providing international protection because of the difficulty in harmonizing the IP laws of individual countries. The effectiveness of the UDRP, however, is not restricted to a
single country. Many governments across the globe are lauding the
success of the UDRP, claiming to support its principles. Over twenty
countries require it in the registration of their domestic country-code
top-level domains. Additionally, the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) has recently selected UDRP as the dispute resolution provider of all of its signature states.52 The ability of WIPO to regulate
and enforce domain name registrars across the globe overcomes the
obstacle of national borders and provides the UDRP an international
scope unprecedented by previous international IP laws.

VII. Conclusion and Recommendations
The Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy has helped to regulate
the large increase in Internet domain name disputes in recent years.
The success of UDRP does not imply that it is free of imperfections.
Many problems have arisen from the current rule that allows the
complainant to choose the dispute resolution provider. As discussed
previously, forum shopping often occurs, and can create a bias in the
decision making process. Complainants will obviously choose the
provider that statistically rules in favor of new domain name holders. There are several potential remedies to this bias. Some feel that
the respondent should be required to pre-select a dispute resolution
provider at the time of registering the domain name. Feeling that this
solution only shifts the bias in the opposite direction, others have
proposed that both parties agree to a single provider, where a third
party or even a lottery could decide on a provider if the complain51
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ant and registrant cannot reach an agreement. Although such
an arrangement is still not free from problems, both parties’ involvement in the selection process greatly reduces the provider’s
tendency to be biased.53
Another component of the UDRP that stands in need of reform
is its ability to withstand reverse domain name hijacking (RDNH).
Critics claim that the policy is “one-sided” and that action should
be taken to protect registrants from being “victims of frivolous
complaints.”54 A. Michael Froomkin, an advocate of UDRP reform,
has advocated the institution of a “surety bond,” of approximately
five thousand dollars, to be awarded to the registrant from the complainant if the arbitration panel finds reverse domain name hijacking.55 This bond could prevent complainants from anxiously seeking
to force a feeble registrant into surrendering his/her domain name.
The UDRP is a sound policy to better reform Internet domain
name disputes as a type of international intellectual property infringement. The above-mentioned reforms to the policy will improve the effectiveness of the policy. Given these minor changes, the
UDRP embodies the necessary application, structure, and regulation
to remove the web of difficulties that currently hinder international
intellectual property law. The UDRP’s ability to utilize arbitration
panels as a time and cost efficient means of law enforcement has
been pivotal to its success. The international success of the UDRP
is also possible due to the focused scope of its application. The use
of unbiased arbitrators and the ease of the arbitration process also
add to the policy’s effectiveness. ICANN’s international application
of the UDRP to all Internet domain name registrars overcomes the
obstacle of differing international IP laws. The unmatched effectiveness of the UDRP has established a model and precedent that future
international intellectual property law can follow.

53

Froomkin, supra note 10, at 691.

54

Id. at 693.

55

Id. at 693–694.

